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Few historic periods have been more thoroughly studied and scrutinized than the 
Paris Peace Conference in 1919. The reason for this interest is hardly surprising 
since after the devastating First World War a truly new epoch started that was 
launched largely by the Peace Conference. Europe was made anew, old empires 
were gone and new states were born, while the new ideology of bolshevism arose to 
challenge the western democracies. Also, amid the general devastation brought on 
by the four long years of war, many states were financially and economically ruined 
and their resuscitation was only imaginable under previously unseen international 
cooperation. This last point was strengthened by the League of Nations called into 
being by the Peace Conference as well. Therefore, the minute study of the year 
1919 in general, and the Conference in particular, is understandable.
This study is focusing on a special and small aspect of the turbulent first half 
of 1919. It examines and compares private diaries made during the half year 
stretching from December 1918 until May 1919. All three diaries in question 
were written by American officers, mainly during their stay in Vienna, Austria, 
and to a smaller degree in Budapest, Hungary, and Bucharest, Romania. All three 
authors came from similar background, were of similar age, and were members of 
the same American field mission, so their vantage point was also similar. In light of 
this, the article wants to compare the three diaries and highlight what similarities 
and perhaps differences can be found in them. Doing so, it will be seen what was 
the general line of thinking not only for these three men, but possibly for a much 
larger group of Americans: what they thought about post-war Europe, the role of 
the United States in this new Europe and the world at large, and, perhaps the most 
interesting factor, how they saw the possible implementation of the Wilsonian 
policy in the future. 
It is imperative to introduce the three authors in a few words as to get a picture 
about who they were.
Walter Goodwin Davis (1885 –1966) was born in Portland, Maine. He attended 
Exeter and later Yale in 1908. After completing his law studies at Harvard in 1911, 
he joined the firm of Shearman and Sterling in New York. Subsequently he pursued 
a business and banking career in his hometown, Portland. Following the American 
declaration of war against Germany in April 1917, Davis attended the Officers 
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Training Camp at Plattsburg, New York, and received a commission as Captain of 
Infantry in early 1918. He was assigned to the Military Intelligence Service, and 
served as Assistant Military Attaché at Berne, Switzerland. After the November 
armistice he was attached to the American Commission to Negotiate Peace in Paris, 
subsequently being transferred to Vienna as a member of the Coolidge Mission, 
where he remained until March 1919.1
Charles M. Storey (1889–1980) came from a rather prominent New England 
family. His father, Moorfield Storey was a well-known lawyer in Boston, 
Massachusetts, with a long practice, various titles in associations, and was a liberal 
person in his political and legal outlook.2 His son, Charles Moorfield Storey, was 
a Harvard graduate, who, after getting his lawyer degree, worked in the Justice 
Department until the end of World War I. After the war he became a member 
of a law firm where he stayed for the remainder of his life. He held various posts 
as members, presidents, and trustees in different organizations, of which being 
Harvard overseer for five years made him the proudest.3 He was a member of the 
Coolidge Mission.
Nicholas Roosevelt (1893–1982) was born in New York City among favorable 
circumstances. The Roosevelt dynasty was one of the most prominent and 
wealthiest families in the United States. Roosevelt belonged to the Long Island 
branch of the family, and lived close to Oyster Bay. His father, James Roosevelt, was 
the cousin of later President Theodore Roosevelt, who, after the premature death 
of James Roosevelt, mainly brought up Nicholas. During World War I he first 
worked as attaché at the American Embassy at Paris for sixteen months, then he 
was at Plattsburgh, New York, in a non-commissioned training camp. Later he was 
in Spain as a secretary to the American International Corporation, which errands 
provided him with invaluable insight into diplomacy and European affairs. At the 
time of the armistice he served in the rank of captain, and joined the Coolidge 
Mission as such in the last days of 1918. 
The American Peace Delegation, exactly in order to learn about the often 
anomalous-looking Central European region, sent the Coolidge Mission to 
Vienna in the first day of 1919. This mission was responsible for gathering as 
much information as possible at its headquarters in Vienna and in the countries 
in the region: Hungary, Romania, the Kingdom of Serbs, Slovenes, and Croats, 
1 The information was gleaned from Guide to the The Walter G. Davis Papers MS 469, compiled by 
N. X. Rizopolous with the assistance of Anne Willard, March 1973, New Haven, Connecticut.
2 Eugene Wambaugh, “Moorfield Storey (1845-1929),” Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts 
and Sciences, Vol. 71, No. 10 (Mar., 1937), 552–556.
3 Theodore Chase, ”Charles Moorfield Storey,” Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society, 
Third Series, Vol. 92 (1980), 151–156.
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and Poland. The motley group of Coolidge’s mission consisted of military 
officers, university and college professors, and lawyers. It was the mission’s task 
to obtain valuable information concerning the present position and outlook of 
the countries mentioned and relay useful data to Paris to help the American Peace 
Delegation in making decisions. Archibald Coolidge sent the various members to 
the aforementioned countries and tried to keep the flow of information to Paris 
at a sustainable and satisfactory pace.4 The three individuals, Davis, Storey, and 
Roosevelt, were all members of this mission. All started their diary entries in Paris, 
which activity must have been spurred by the momentous circumstances of peace 
making after the devastating war.
What are really diaries and what is their significance from the point of view of 
studying history? Diaries are a personal mirror on history. Although reflected and 
retained through this personal lens, and therefore distortions are natural, history 
presented from the first person singular perspective enriches our knowledge about 
a certain event or period. The diary as a form of and mirror on history has been 
around for centuries, but the first detailed diary entries came into being during the 
Renaissance, which era produced an earlier unknown measure of self-consciousness 
and, in the wake of it, a larger need for self-reflection.5 The almost universal practice 
of putting down observations in a diary, however, really became in vogue in the 
mid-nineteenth century. Most typically, persons belonging to the upper classes 
in general grabbed their pens, but diplomats and politicians in particular were 
active in this field. Today, this form of preserving the present seems to be on the 
wane, largely due to the digital and globalized world, where the visual image is 
taking its place. The diary entry is a living imprint of history, since those persons 
scribbling down events into their diaries reflect fresh experience and observation, 
and they do it right after the event takes place, so the usually distorting feature of 
many years and distant memory do not play a role in being historically correct. 
On the other hand, the diary entry can also be seen as a form of literature, even if 
the notes sometimes in short form are not representatives of fine literature. That 
is why it has an “unsure status,” because the diary is “an uncertain genre uneasily 
balanced between literary and historical writing, between spontaneity of reportage 
and the reflectiveness of the crafted text, between selfhood and events, between 
4 For the history of the Coolidge Mission see Harold Jefferson Coolidge and Robert Howard Lord, 
Archibald Cary Coolidge: Life and Letters, (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1932), 192–
216.
5 David L. Ransel, “The Diary of a Merchant: Insights into Eighteenth-Century Plebeian Life,” The 
Russian Review, Vol. 63, No. 4 (Oct., 2004), 596.
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subjectivity and objectivity, between the private and the public.”6 Obviously, one 
always has to be on guard when faced with a diary entry, because, if nothing else, 
the unavoidable subjectivity will play a part. 
Still, these entries usually reflect history well. This does not mean that we 
should look at diaries as refutable historical artifacts, since these texts are personal 
“images” only.7 Coloring, magnifying, and distorting facts, as well as errors are 
all characteristic of it, but that also holds true for professional history writing. 
Although there are naturally plenty counterexamples, in most cases the author of 
a diary entry does not purposefully distort the story he or she writes down. The 
author’s primary goal is clearly to preserve the present and not to lie about history.8 
The author wishes on reading the entries to be able to reproduce events and feelings 
ten, twenty, thirty, or more years later, irrespective of its nature—family, politics, or 
war. So, while a historian mainly analyzes the past, a diary entry mainly preserves 
it. This preservation may show signs of idiosyncrasies, also those of an analytical 
mind of the observer, but it presents history as it was for that individual.
Depending on time and place, the level of “freedom” of the diary entries may 
also differ. If someone lives in a society and jots down events when they do not 
need to worry about the material getting into the wrong hands, the opinion will 
be a more open one, the author will be committed to a more “honest” style. On 
the contrary, in the atmosphere of an oppressive regime, a diary person will choose 
circumventing wording and style, even perhaps a code, driven by the fear what 
might happen to them if the authorities find the entries, read them, and, as a 
consequence, punish the author and /or their family. Seen from this point of view, 
the authors of the three diaries examined here, it can be stated that they could 
write as freely as they wished, even if some of the entries were put down in “enemy 
countries”—they did not need to worry about being punished for their contents. 
Naturally, only looking back a hundred years later can we appreciate the historical 
significance of some of the entries in these diaries.9
All three of these Americans were then headquartered in Vienna, where they 
gathered information first and foremost by meeting and interviewing various 
shades of Austrians. They made shorter or longer trips to Hungary as well, and in 
6 Rachael Langford and Russell West, eds., Marginal Voices, Marginal Forms: Diaries in European 
Literature and History (Amsterdam, 1999), 8.
7 Gábor Gyáni, „A napló mint társadalomtörténeti forrás”, [The Diary as Sociological Source] 
Szabolcs-szatmár-beregi levéltári évkönyv, 1997, vol. 12, 25.
8 Pál Pritz, „Napló és történelem”, [Diary and History] Múltunk, 2017, vol. 62, 1., 4–6.
9 This section on diaries as history is almost identical with Zoltán Peterecz, “Immediate Post-World 
War I Hungary through the Eyes of an American”, Hungarian Studies, vol. 32, no. 2, (2018), 306-7. 
https://doi.org/10.1556/044.2018.32.2.12
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the case of Storey and Roosevelt, also to Romania. If one studies the three diaries 
in some detail, there will be various points that stand out as the most conspicuous 
questions that interested all three persons. The most typical common features can 
be listed as the following: the possible danger of bolshevism, the role of the United 
States and of the Wilsonian principle in drawing up the new borders, Wilson as 
the self-proclaimed messiah of the new world order, dire circumstances in Vienna, 
political intrigue of the successor states, the impossible worldview of Hungarian 
nobles, daily chores of the mission (interviews with various people in Vienna and 
Budapest), daily life in Vienna and Budapest, Viennese opera, etc. It is worth 
looking at some of these points and see how closely the three intelligence officers 
thought about these points or whether there are major differences in their analysis 
of these issues. In the rest of the article, these issues will be introduced through the 
diary entries of the three Americans, and their notes will be compared as to prove 
whether they all saw the same things or whether there are discrepancies in how 
they experienced the surrounding events and personalities. 
Clearly, one of the most defining issues in the immediate postwar worldview in 
the West in general, and in the United States in particular, was the fear of Soviet-
Russian bolshevism and the panic that it might spread there from the East. The 
antagonism between the two nations went back a long time. In 1837, for example, 
a German-born American journalist described the eastern power in the following 
terms: “Russia is the evil genius of history; while America is its guardian angel. 
The power of Russia is opposed to the interests of humanity; that of the United 
States is based on wisdom and justice… The power of Russia rests on bayonets; 
that of America on the superiority of mind over brute force. They are to each 
other as darkness to light… The day of battle must come; the war of principles 
must ensue.”10 Toward the end of the nineteenth century another example is the 
following thesis: “At heart the Russian is still more Asiatic than European. We 
call him Christian; but his religion is a mingling of superstition and fanaticism 
less attractive, and certainly less conducive to morality, than the religion of the 
Bedouins.”11 So, when the Bolshevik revolution took place and started to show more 
and more antagonistic signs toward western and, especially, American thinking, 
not much was needed for a crusade-like atmosphere to gather that was an amalgam 
of righteousness and fear. As Hoover put it, after the war was over, “there began 
to loom up a greater fear from a more potent enemy of freedom than anarchy, 
10 Francis J. Grund, The Americans, in Their Moral, Social, and Political Relations (Boston, 1837), 392-
393. Quoted in C. Vann Woodward, The Old World’s New World, New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1991, 88.
11 William R. Thayer, “The Armed Truce of the Powers.” Forum, vol. 12 (November 1891), 322.
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which after all is an unorganized force. Communism, which had captured Russia, 
was a new form of organized destruction of Liberty. And it was vengeance itself. 
The Communists had captured the Czarist gold reserves. Their agents spread over 
Europe, subsidizing a new revolution. Soon we began to realize that its infectious 
poison was spreading alarmingly among all starving peoples. Here loomed up a 
defeat of all we had fought for—to establish liberty.”12 To Robert Lansing, the 
American Secretary of State, bolshevism  was “the most hideous and monstrous 
thing the human mind has ever conceived.”13 Many agreed with the conclusion 
of a US Senate subcommittee’s paper that said: “The activities of the Bolsheviki 
constitute a complete repudiation of modern civilization.”14
As far as the members of the Coolidge mission are concerned, they could see some 
of the communistic leanings close up and personal. Therefore, it is interesting what 
they thought about it courtesy to their first-hand experience. Davis, when he spent 
two days in Budapest, a city where communist takeover had been expected by some, 
commented wryly on the situation as he saw it: “Today proved a disappointment. 
There was no Bolshevik revolution, no massacre of Christians.”15 While Storey 
only hinted at the social problems that were connected with the possibility of a 
communist coup, Roosevelt, for his part, who was present when the Hungarian 
Soviet Republic was declared, was more vehement than his colleagues when it 
came to Bolshevism. In his mind, Bolshevism was a phenomenon spread by the 
Jews: “it is merely the work of a few unscrupulous Hungarian and Russian Jews, 
working with a few scoundrelly [sic] Austrian Jews, and playing on the feelings of 
a hungry mob to ride into power themselves.”16 At the same time, he detected that 
there was a unifying force of the Bolshevik movement in Hungary on account of 
the drastic mutilation of the country’s former territory. 
When the subject of the diary entries was the role of the United States in the 
postwar world, the three men were in unison in their view. They all agreed that the 
various countries of war-torn Europe looked to the United States as the possible 
redeemer, whether the issue was economic, financial, or political in nature. Storey 
wrote that almost all of the European continent was “looking to America as a 
12 Herbert Clark Hoover, The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover. Vol. 1–3. New York, The Macmillan 
Company, 1951–1952, vol. 1, 283.
13 Quoted in Michael H. Hunt, Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy. New Haven and London, Yale 
University Press, 1987, 115.
14 Ibid.
15 Dairy entry, February 2, 1919, Walter G. Davis Diary, Box 1, Folder 16, Walter Goodwin Davis 
Papers (MS 469), Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library, USA.
16 Diary entry of April 21, 1919, A History of a Few Weeks, Box 18, Nicholas Roosevelt Papers, Syracuse 
University Libraries, United States, 423.
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composite savior, guardian angel, boundary commission, and food supply.”17 In the 
defeated capitals of Central Europe, naturally, Americans were even more welcome. 
As Davis registered upon their arrival in Austria, “everyone to whom we have talked 
says emphatically that American officers are a welcome sight. They would be better 
pleased if we were accompanied by occupying troops.”18 Roosevelt strengthened this 
view. “Everyone,” he wrote, “no matter of what former persuasion or nationality, 
looks to America—Huns as well as Czechs; Slovaks as well as Slovenes; Austrians 
as well as Serbo-Croates; Roumanians as well as Ukrainians. America is apparently 
the referee in this big game, from their point of view.”19 It is little surprise that both 
in Vienna and Budapest, the mission and its members were seen as the ultimate 
channel to the American Peace Delegation in Paris, as all three men’s diaries attest. 
Wilson’s role was discussed in the diaries as well. The author of the Fourteen 
Points loomed large over everybody’s mind in those months, and victors and 
defeated parties alike hoped the salvation from their own interpretation of Wilson’s 
peace agenda. This was a major problem: different countries understood in different 
light what Wilson chose to say, obviously their interpretation favoring their own 
cause. The Fourteen Points were so universal and so idealistic that it was bound 
to create controversy and clearly could not satisfy all sides. The hub of it was 
national self-determination the lofty ideals of which it was impossible to live up 
to, and, consequently, it was unmanageable to do justice among the existing ethnic 
conditions in Central Europe. Secretary of State Robert Lansing was convinced 
“of the danger of putting such ideas into the minds of certain races. It is bound to 
be the basis of impossible demands on the Peace Congress and create trouble in 
many lands.”20 He found the phrase was “loaded with dynamite” that would only 
raise hopes in vain, and finally would be “discredited, to be called the dream of an 
idealist who failed to realize the danger until too late to check those who attempt 
to put the principle in force.”21 While Storey only referred to the unfeasibility of 
the principle in Transylvania, where one purely Romanian village was followed by a 
similarly pure Hungarian settlement, he criticized Wilson for his veneer of idealism 
that tried to conceal hard truths. The president, he said, “comes to the Conference, 
unprepared, and undismayed—Sir Galahad from the West with a wooden sword 
17 Diary entry, November 26, 1918, Charles Moorfield Storey Journal, 1918-1919, Massachusetts 
Historical Society, United States.
18 Diary entry, January 5, 1919, Davis Diary.
19 Diary entry, April 21, 1919, A History of a Few Weeks, 152.
20 Diary entry, December 30, 1918, In. Robert Lansing, The Peace Negotiations: A Personal Narrative 
(New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1921, 97.
21 Ibid., 97–98.
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to carve the casques of some of the hardest-headed individuals in Europe today.”22 
But Roosevelt was once more sharper when it came to condemning Wilson. He 
accused the president with undue and exorbitant optimism, and characterized 
the president as someone who opted for “a well-worded, moralistic rhetorical 
sentence” instead of practical foreign policy. For Roosevelt such rhetoric would, 
and he mainly had Wilson’s Fourteen Points in mind, give the false impression that 
“this verbal patent medicine will purge Europe of her ills overnight, and introduce 
the reign of brotherly love.”23
Perhaps it is of interest to compare the opinions on Hungarians in general, or 
on some specific persons. Although one cannot find exactly corresponding subjects 
of deep analysis in the diaries of the three Americans, more than one outstanding 
person was written about in detail. For obvious reasons, Mihály Károlyi, President 
of Hungary at that time, was one such person. Storey was struck by the Hungarian 
leader “as being sincere, honest, a man prone to think better of the world that 
it deserved, an idealist… an extremely human person, capable of exciting a 
blind affection, based as much on his weakness as on his strength.”24 He added 
that, in his view, Károlyi was “an idealist, something of a dreamer, scrupulously 
honest, considered by some a poor judge of men and subject to the influence 
of stronger characters. Personally he is extremely attractive, a good talker and 
has made on all of us a deep impression. There is no doubt as to the depth and 
sincerity of his conviction and to his force. To my mind he is an extremely forceful 
personality, and has displayed considerable political instinct.”25 As for Roosevelt, 
he also met and held conversations with Károlyi. His basic impression was also 
praise and a mild enchantment. He characterized Károlyi as “a sincere patriot,” 
who “through his patriotism […] took the helm, only to be faced by impossible 
problems, attacked from within and without, with nowhere to turn.”26 This last 
point soon materialized when the so-called Vix Note was handed over to Károlyi, 
and where N. Roosevelt was also present.27 The Vix Note was to inform the 
22 Dairy entry, December 14, 1918, Storey Journal.
23 Diary entry without date, but it is from late March, 1919, Nicholas Roosevelt, A History of a Few 
Weeks, 383.
24 Dairy entry, January 15, 1919, C. M. Storey Journal.
25 Storey to Dulles, February 3, 1919, Storey, Charles M. 1919, Box 53 Folder 19, Allen W. Dulles 
Papers; Public Policy Papers, Department of Rare Books and Special Collections, Princeton 
University Library.
26 Diary entry of March 20, 1919, A History of a Few Weeks, 279.
27 Fernand Vix (1876–1941), French military officer, the leader of the Inter-Allied Military Mission in 
Budapest in 1919. He handed over the allied note to president Mihály Károlyi on March 20, 1919, 
which the latter and his government could not accept and resigned instead, opening the way for a 
communist takeover.  
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Hungarian government to withdraw deep into its former territory, and it basically 
foreshadowed the dismemberment of Hungary at the Peace Conference.
Albert Apponyi was the grand old man of Hungarian politics, the most well-
known figure outside Hungary. While Storey remembered more vividly Apponyi’s 
looks and his command of the English language, Roosevelt formulated a deeper 
opinion about the Hungarian. The two had actually met fifteen years earlier, 
when Apponyi visited Theodore Roosevelt at Oyster Bay. The Apponyi of present 
day basically gave a presentation of how Hungary would seek revenge if it were 
mutilated with millions of Hungarians left outside the mother country. Even 
worse, he implied that in the case of dismemberment, the Hungarians living in the 
United States, together with the Germans there, would make a united effort against 
Wilson and the Democratic Party. Roosevelt was, of course, a Republican but such 
a brazen threat against American democracy left him angry. No wonder that his 
assessment of Apponyi was mixed at best: “He is an interesting old scoundrel—
very intelligent, perfectly unrepentant, and a thorough Chauvinist.”28 
When it came to Pál Teleki, Storey again was struck by the extent to which 
an educated Hungarian noble could use English. Roosevelt, who met Teleki on 
more occasions, gave again a more thorough description of the man. Teleki had 
a very good impression on the American, partly because the latter learned a lot 
of information from the renowned geographer and cartographer, and future 
prime minister of Hungary. Teleki came through as “the most intelligent and in 
his line the ablest” among all the Hungarians Roosevelt had met.29 As Roosevelt 
noted, Teleki “gave me a mass of information that filled up many gaps in my scant 
knowledge of Hungarian affairs… I got almost everything I wanted to know.”30 
Naturally, Teleki was feeding the American with careful propaganda regarding the 
expected large ethnic Hungarian blocs in the successor countries, which is a further 
indication how everybody in these countries grasped any American as a possible 
channel to the highest decision makers at Paris. 
Davis, for his part, wrote his impression concerning Hungarian nobles based 
upon his contact with them at Vienna. His opinion was not flattering. “These 
Hungarian aristocrats are absolutely impossible to converse with,” he wrote in 
his diary, “their ideas are hopelessly sixteenth century, and with every breath they 
prove against themselves those accusations of feudal mentality made by Mr. Seton-
Watson. Countess Hadik told me as a proof of the uselessness of all Slovaques [sic], 
that the peasants on her husband’s estates would never have learned even to speak 
28 Diary entry of February 28, 1919, A History of a Few Weeks, 202.
29 Diary entry of April 16, 1919, A History of a Few Weeks, 279.
30 Diary entry of February 28, 1919, A History of a Few Weeks, 203.
88
Magyar if he had not built schools and compelled them to go to them! A frank 
admission of the forcible magyarization of this nationality which is willing to suffer 
martyrdom rather than give up its own language.”31 Storey gave a quick study 
of the other end of the spectrum—the Transylvanian Hungarians. The Szekler 
people struck him as crude but honest folks: “I must say that the Szeklers made us 
feel very much at home. To my mind they resembled our New Englanders, with 
a certain simplicity, sturdiness, and an independence amounting to obstinacy in 
many cases.”32 But from a political aspect the verdict was different, especially after 
conducting a handful of interviews in Kolozsvár: “In the first place all these people 
were so irreconcilable, so pigheaded, so narrow. In the second place they were 
utterly out of joint with the new tunes; and were being buoyed up with hopes for 
the return of the old royal order. Lastly they were not thinking; which were the 
saddest of all. The most that could be said was that they were brooding over present 
wrongs, and idealizing a dull and long moribund past.”33
Conclusion
What is to be learned from these personal diaries written during the same time and 
place, based upon a very similar experience? These diaries do not contradict our 
knowledge of the events taking place in the aftermath of World War I in Central 
Europe. The facts are not challenged by these witness testimonies. What the entries 
reveal are mainly twofold. On the one hand, they allow the present-day reader a 
glimpse into what it was like to be a member of an American intelligence-gathering 
mission in early 1919 in Vienna and Budapest. The three authors’ views basically 
corroborate each other as far as the daily challenges and tasks are concerned for the 
Coolidge Mission. On the other hand, and perhaps this is the real value of these 
pages written a little bit over a hundred years ago, the diaries introduce persons of 
historic fame and represent them as these American officers saw them. Their own 
personal slant was magnified beyond the pure facts. Largely unbiased opinions greet 
us when we read these diaries—inescapably peppered with individual preferences. 
The three diaries personalize two struggling Central European capitals, and also 
nations, that try to find the way out of the murky aftermath of a defeated war. 
Davis’, Storey’s, and Roosevelt’s diaries enrich our collective knowledge of the early 
months of 1919, and tell us a lot about how the American officers of the day 
typically saw and related to their Central European host countries and the people 
living here. 
31 Diary entry, February 13, 1919, Davis Diary.
32 Dairy entry, February 15, 1919, C. M. Storey Journal.
33 Dairy entry, February 19, 1919, C. M. Storey Journal.
